Digital sovereignty in Europe

Why dependence on infrastructure is no longer a marginal issue

Digital sovereignty is often discussed abstractly – in political programmes, strategy papers or long-term goals. In economic reality, however, the issue is much more concrete: where digital infrastructure becomes a prerequisite for stability, planning security and the ability to act.

The central question is no longer whether Europe is digitally dependent, but to what extent – and with what consequences.

Dependence is a reality, not an exception

How deep this dependence goes is proven by a recent survey by the digital association Bitkom. According to this, 89 percent of German companies that source digital technologies or services from abroad say they are dependent on it (Bitkom, 2025). 51 percent rate this dependence as strong, another 38 percent rather strong. The situation becomes even clearer when it comes to the question of one’s own ability to act: 57 percent of companies see themselves as able to survive for a maximum of one year without digital imports. Only 4 percent state that they can get by without corresponding imports in the long term (Bitkom, 2025). Digital dependence is therefore not a marginal phenomenon, but structurally anchored.

The dependence does not affect individual technologies, but almost all areas of digital value creation. According to Bitkom, 96 percent of companies use digital technologies or services from abroad. These include end devices, hardware components such as chips and sensors, software applications, cybersecurity solutions, and digital machines and IT services (Bitkom, 2025). The figures make it clear that digital infrastructure is internationally intertwined along the entire value chain – from the hardware level to software-based services.

USA and China as dominant dependency partners

Companies name the USA and China as the most important countries of origin of digital technologies. 67 percent of companies frequently import digital technologies from the United States, 58 percent often from China. At the same time, perceived dependence on both countries has increased significantly in 2025 (Bitkom, 2025).
According to their own estimates, German companies would only be able to spend around twelve months without digital imports from the USA, and only eleven months without imports from China (Bitkom, 2025). These assessments illustrate the close link between technological performance and international supply relationships. Parallel to the increasing dependency, trust in central countries of origin is declining. According to Bitkom (2025), 60 percent of companies say they trust the U.S. little or not at all. The share of companies with confidence in the United States fell from 51 to 38 percent.

This creates an area of tension: digital dependencies remain, while trust in political and economic conditions decreases. Digital infrastructure is increasingly perceived as a risk factor.

Digital sovereignty as a structural challenge

In this context, digital sovereignty is understood less as complete independence and more as the ability to identify, evaluate and control dependencies in a targeted manner. This is not about isolation, but about transparency, resilience and the ability to act. Digital dependency is the norm for European companies. Digital sovereignty is not a short-term solution, but a long-term design task. It requires transparency about existing dependencies, realistic risk assessments and conscious decisions along the digital infrastructure.

The central question is therefore not whether digital sovereignty is necessary, but how companies deal with existing dependencies and where they want to strengthen their ability to act in a targeted manner.